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IT'S ALL ABOUT WHAT YOU KNOW:







Criminal convictions for violations of federal environmental
statutes have increased dramatically in the past decade. During
fiscal years 1997 and 1998, the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) levied $169.3 million and $92.8 million, re-
spectively, in criminal fines.' These figures marked the highest
and second-highest annual totals of criminal fines in EPA his-
tory.2 Essentially, this trend is positive and promotes the aggres-
sive criminal enforcement agenda Congress intended under the
federal environmental statutes. However, it is coextensive with
at least one troubling distortion of congressional intent: applica-
tion of the general intent, rather than specific intent, standard to
the prosecution of "knowing" violations of the Clean Water Act
(CWA).
3
Two types of knowledge, or "scienter," requirements are
used in criminal statutes: 1) general intent; and 2) specific intent.
4
To secure a conviction under a general intent statute, the prose-
cution only needs to show that the defendant intended his ac-
tions.5 Under the general intent standard, whether the defendant
* Visiting Associate Professor and Director, Legal Methods Program,
Widener University School of Law, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. B.A., cur laude,
University of Rochester, 1986; J.D., M.S.L., Vermont Law School, 1989.
** Candidate for J.D., Widener University School of Law, 2002; B.S.,
Pennsylvania State University, 1998.
1 Fiscal 1998 Action Led to $184 Million in Criminal, Civil, Administrative
Penalties, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 2375 (Apr. 2, 1999).
2 Id. A single case involving a seventy-five million dollar fine in 1997 ac-
counts for the significant disparity between the figures for 1997 and 1998. Id.
3 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
4 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 422-24 (1985).
5 Id. at 425.
304
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
2001] "KNOWING" VIOLATIONS OF THE CLEAN IVATER ACT 305
intended the criminal consequences of his actions is of no im-
port.6 If specific intent is required, however, the prosecution
must show that the defendant intended the illegal consequences
of his actions. To be culpable, the defendant must have been
aware that his behavior constituted a crime.
7
Section 309(c)(2)(A) of the CWA provides that an individ-
ual commits a felony when he "knowingly violates" various sec-
tions of the Act, "or any permit condition or limitation."8 A
plain language reading of this text suggests that the defendant
must know his actions are illegal. The adverb "knowingly" modi-
fies the verb "violates." Thus, the defendant must "know" he is
"violating" the Act to "knowingly violate" it.9
Despite inclusion of this "knowing" violation language, sev-
eral courts have interpreted the text to require only a general
intent, rather than specific intent, standard for knowing violation
prosecutions under the Clean Water Act.10 Applying the general
intent standard to alleged violations of section 309(c)(2)(A) un-
dermines congressional intent and risks the overcriminalization
of negligent or reckless behavior at the higher level of "knowing"
criminal conduct.
Part I of this Article examines the historical and conceptual
foundations of the specific intent standard both outside and
vithin the environmental law context. Part II addresses the his-
torical and conceptual foundations of the general intent stan-
dard, also outside and within the environmental law context.
Part IR reviews the history of the conflict between application of
the specific intent and general intent standards in prosecutions
for knowing violations of the Clean Water Act. Part IV presents
6 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-60 (1952).
7 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618-19 (1994) (holding
that the government must prove defendant knew of features of a machine gun
that brought it within the scope of the National Firearms Act).
8 Section 309(c)(2)(A) of the Clean Water Act provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who ... knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1318,
1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345... or any permit condition or limitation imple-
menting any of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342...
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000
per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by
both.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) (1994).
9 United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 261 (4th Cir. 1997).
10 See, eg., Wilson, 133 F.3d 251; United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 251 (Sth
Cir. 1997); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995); United States
v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993).
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arguments that support application of the specific intent standard
to knowing violation cases under section 309(c)(2)(A) of the
CWA. Part V analyzes the Ninth Circuit's decision and the
United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in United
States v. Hanousek."1 The Article concludes that the Supreme
Court should grant certiorari to address knowing violations of
the Clean Water Act and decide that such violations are subject
to a specific intent analysis.
I
HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE SPECIFIC INTENT STANDARD
A. Background: The Specific Intent Standard in
Non-Environmental Contexts
The conflict between application of the specific and general
intent standards traces its origins to a series of Supreme Court
cases outside the environmental law context. In 1952, the Su-
preme Court in Morissette v. United States'2 addressed knowing
violations as applied to the elements of the federal embezzlement
statute. The provision states: "[w]hoever embezzles, steals, pur-
loins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or
without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record,
voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States... [s]hall
be fined.' 3 Lack of knowledge that what one is doing consti-
tutes a "conversion," the Court held, is a defense to a charge of
"knowingly converting" federal property.14 The Court required
that the defendant have knowledge of the facts that made the
taking a conversion-that is, that the property belonged to the
United States.' 5
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions addressing specific in-
tent issues relied on the analysis contained in the seminal deci-
sion in Morissette. In a 1985 case, Liparota v. United States, 16 the
Supreme Court addressed a violation of the federal statute gov-
erning food stamp fraud.' 7 The applicable provision states:
11 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000).
12 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
13 Id. at 248 n.2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 641).
14 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 271.
15 Id.
16 471 U.S. 419, 420 (1985).
17 Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1)).
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"whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses
coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by
[the statute] or the regulations" is subject to a fine and imprison-
ment.'8 The Court held that this provision requires a showing
that the defendant knew his conduct to be unauthorized by the
statute or regulations. 19 The Court reasoned that "to interpret
the statute [to dispense with mens rea] would be to criminalize a
broad range of apparently innocent conduct." 20
The Supreme Court decided a trio of cases in 1994 that con-
firmed the specific intent rationale developed in Morissette and
Liparota. In Ratzlaf v. United States,21 the defendant was con-
victed of structuring financial transactions to avoid currency re-
porting requirements. The statute provides that any person
"willfully violating" this anti-structuring provision is subject to
criminal penalties.2 The Court held the government must prove
that the defendant acted with knowledge that the restructuring
he undertook was unlawful.2
The other two cases in the trio reinforce this interpretation.
In Staples v. United States,24 the Court addressed a conviction
under the National Firearms Act (NFA),25 which imposes strict
registration requirements on statutorily defined firearms. The
NFA makes it unlawful for any person to possess a machine gun
that is not properly registered with the federal government.
2 6
The Court held the government was required to prove that the
defendant knew of the features of his gun that made it a "fire-
arm" under the NFA.27 The Court reasoned that the potentially
harsh penalty attached to a violation of the provision at issue-
imprisonment for up to ten years-confirmed that Congress did
not intend to dispense with the mens rea requirement 28
Like Staples, the Supreme Court in United States v. X-Cite-
ment Video, Inc.29 also addressed the issue of criminalizing other-
18 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 420.
19 Id at 425.
20 Id. at 426.
21 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994).
22 d. at 136.
23 Id at 138.
24 511 U.S. 600, 602 (1994).
25 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1994).
26 Staples, 511 U.S. at 603.
27 Id. at 619.
28 Id- at 616.
29 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
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wise lawful conduct. The case involved a conviction under The
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act,30 which
concerns the trafficking of pornography depicting minors. In re-
versing the conviction, the Court stated that it was improper to
impose a relaxed mens rea requirement because the trafficking of
pornography alone was not unlawful. What rendered the con-
duct illicit was the age of the participants. Therefore, the Court
held that "knowingly" applied to each of the statutory elements
of the offense. 31 The Court reasoned that a relaxed mens rea
standard to exclude knowledge of the age of the participants
would criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.32
This line of Supreme Court cases interpreting the nature and
scope of the specific intent standard underscores two analytical
starting points for this Article. First, the Court has consistently
refused to eliminate the "guilty mind" requirement in the ab-
sence of congressional intent to the contrary. Second, a "know-
ing" violation requires knowledge of the applicable law
regulating the defendant's conduct. This interpretation does not
undermine the principle that "ignorance of the law is no ex-
cuse."'33 Ignorance of the law cannot exonerate criminal defen-
dants from all forms of culpability. However, it can, and should,
allow a defendant to avoid conviction for a "knowing" violation
of the law.
B. The Specific Intent Standard as Applied to Federal
Environmental Statutes
1. General Environmental Cases
Evolving from its origins in non-environmental contexts, the
specific intent standard was subsequently applied to federal envi-
ronmental statutes such as the Clean Water Act,34 the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),35 and the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act (TSCA).36 Apart from the Clean Water Act
30 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1), (2) (1994).
31 X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72.
32 Id. at 73.
33 See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 261 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)).
34 See infra Part III.
35 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The knowing violation
provisions of RCRA are extensive and appear in section 3008(d). § 6928(d).
36 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994). TSCA regulates chemical substances and
mixtures that present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environ-
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cases, RCRA cases effectively illustrate the underlying rationale
for applying the specific intent standard to knowing violations of
federal environmental laws.
Several RCRA cases have addressed alleged knowing viola-
tions of permit requirements. In United States v. Johnson & Tow-
ers, Inc., the Third Circuit held that the "knowing requirement
applied to each element of the offense. '37 The defendants were
indicted for knowingly disposing of hazardous waste without a
permit under section 3008(d)(2)(A) of RCRA. The indictment
alleged the defendants knew that: (1) they were disposing of
materials; (2) which were hazardous wastes; (3) at a facility for
which there was no RCRA permit; and (4) that a permit require-
ment existed under the statute and regulations.38 Although the
court indicated that the provision at issue was part of a public
welfare statute, the court required a specific intent standard.
3 9
Its reasons for applying the specific intent standard included pro-
moting statutory consistency.4 0 the fact that the defendants were
merely employees rather than owners or operators of a facility,4 1
public policy concerns regarding hazardous wastes,42 and the
government's high burden of proof.43
In applying the specific intent standard to knowing viola-
tions of permit requirements or permit status under RCRA,
some courts have addressed the need to avoid criminalizing inno-
cent conduct. In United States v. Speach, the defendant was con-
victed of knowingly transporting hazardous waste to a facility
that lacked a permit.44 The court reversed the conviction, hold-
ing that the defendant had to have actual knowledge that the fa-
cility lacked a RCRA storage permit.45 The court reasoned that
ment. Section 16(b) renders it unlawful to knowingly or willfully violate any
provision of section 15, the "prohibited acts" section of the statute. § 2614. See
United States v. Catucci, 55 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming conviction
under section 16(b) of defendant who knew that removers of PCB-laden trans-
formers located at his facility would dump the PCBs in violation of TSCA).
37 741 F.2d 662, 669 (3d Cir. 1984).
38 Id. at 668-69.
39 Id. at 666.
40 Id- at 668-69.
41 Id. at 664-67.
42 Id. at 666-67.
43 Id at 669. See Karen M. Hansen, "Knowing" Environmental Crimes, 16
WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 987, 1005-06 (1990).
44 968 F.2d 795, 796 (9th Cir. 1992).
45 Id. at 797. See also United States v. Hill, 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 5478, *2
(9th Cir. Mar. 18,1998) (relying on Speadr and affirming defendant's conviction
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"[r]emoving the knowledge requirement would criminalize inno-
cent conduct, such as that of a transporter who relied in good
faith upon a recipient's fraudulent certificate. '46
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of
criminalizing otherwise lawful conduct in United States v. Hayes
International Corp., a case that dealt with unlawful transporta-
tion of hazardous waste under RCRA.47 The statute prohibits
anyone from "knowingly transport[ing] ... any hazardous waste
identified or listed [in that chapter] to a facility which does not
have a permit. '48 The court held that knowledge of the permit
status was required because the "precise wrong Congress in-
tended to combat .. was transportation to an unlicensed facil-
ity."'49 The court noted that removal of the knowing requirement
would criminalize innocent behavior; for example, when a defen-
dant reasonably believes that a facility had a permit, "but in fact
had been misled by people at the site."50
Underscoring the significance of knowledge of the applica-
ble law in securing knowing violation convictions, the Tenth Cir-
cuit addressed the "good faith defense" in United States v. Self.51
In Self, the court affirmed a conviction under section
3008(d)(2)(B) of RCRA for knowingly storing hazardous waste.
The court stated that "a good faith belief that a permit allows a
particular manner of treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous
waste, when in fact it does not, is a defense to a criminal
charge."52 The court, however, did not accept the defendant's
reliance on the good faith defense because the defendant knew
he was in violation of the RCRA permit.5 3 Significantly, the
court made an important clarification concerning what a defen-
dant needs to know to be convicted: "[w]hile the government was
for a knowing violation of RCRA when he knew his driver transported hazard-
ous waste to, and stored the waste at, a facility that lacked the necessary RCRA
permit).
46 Speach, 968 F.2d at 796 (quoting United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786
F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986)).
47 786 F.2d at 1501.
48 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) (1994).
49 Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d at 1504.
50 Id. See also United States v. Heuer, 4 F.3d 723,731 (9th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that in the absence of specific guidance from RCRA's legislative history, the
knowledge requirement extends to each element of the offense in a conviction
for the illegal disposal of hazardous waste).
51 2 F.3d 1071, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993).
52 Id. at 1091.
53 Id.
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not required to prove that Defendant knew that the material was
identified or listed as hazardous waste under RCRA regulations,
the government was required to prove that Defendant knew the
material was hazardous in that it held the potential to be harmful
to persons or the environment.
'54
2. Environmental Cases Involving Corporate Officers
Like their subordinates, corporate officers also risk being
snared in a large net for "knowing" violations of federal environ-
mental statutes. The responsible corporate officer doctrine,
which pre-dates the enactment of federal environmental statutes,
is the source of this potential danger. The mens rea standard for
knowing violations in the context of corporate officers has been
relaxed to allow two alternate sources of knowledge: 1) imputed
knowledge; and 2) deliberate avoidance (or willful blindness).
These two forms of knowledge eliminate the need for actual
knowledge to secure convictions of corporate officers for "know-
ing" violations.
In 1985, the Ninth Circuit addressed the deliberate avoid-
ance doctrine in the context of violations of TSCA in United
States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc.5 5 The court reversed the
defendants' convictions because of improper jury instructions on
the deliberate avoidance doctrine.:5 6 The trial court had in-
structed that a conviction would be appropriate if "the defendant
was aware of a high probability" that TSCA was being violated
"and deliberately avoided learning the truth."5' The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the evidence the government had presented
did not warrant use of the instruction. There was no showing
that the defendants "avoided learning the true nature of the fluid
inside the capacitors so as to build a defense in the event of ar-
rest."58 In addition, no evidence indicated that corporate head-
quarters had informed the defendants that the capacitors might
contain PCBs.59 Finally, there was no evidence that defendants
"knew what capacitors were or what they contained." 60 The de-
fendants were not liable under the deliberate avoidance doctrine
54 Id.
55 768 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1985).
56 Id. at 1098-99.
57 Id. at 1098.
58 Id. at 1099.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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because an awareness of a high probability of the need to investi-
gate did not exist.
In United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,61
the First Circuit vacated a conviction under RCRA of the owner
and president of a waste oil company.62 It held that the jury in-
structions erroneously permitted a finding of guilt in the absence
of any proof that the president had actual knowledge of the vio-
lations.63 The court distinguished United States v. Dotterweich64
and United States v. Park,65 both of which were based on a strict
liability misdemeanor statute, noting that it knew of "no prece-
dent for failing to give effect to a knowledge requirement that
Congress has expressly included in a criminal statute.
'66
Like MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil, the court in United
States v. White held that a corporate officer could not be held
criminally liable under RCRA absent actual knowledge.67 In
White, a company and several employees were charged with un-
lawful storage and disposal of hazardous waste in violation of
RCRA. Section 3008(d)(2)(A) of RCRA, which contains the el-
ement of a knowing violation, was at issue. The court concluded
that "the government must prove not only knowing treatment,
storage or disposal of hazardQus waste but also that the defen-
dant knew the waste was hazardous. ' 68 Therefore, the corporate
officer could not be convicted of the offense solely on the basis of
his position.
This line of cases, maintaining a high burden on the govern-
ment in cases of knowing violations of both corporate officers
and lower-level employees, is positive and should continue. Un-
fortunately, as discussed in Part II of this Article, several courts
have misapplied the public welfare offense doctrine 69 and con-
61 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
62 Id. at 61.
63 Id. at 51.
64 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943) (affirming conviction of corporation president
under Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act for shipping adulterated and mislabeled
drugs, even though evidence of "consciousness of wrongdoing [was] totally
wanting").
65 421 U.S. 658, 670, 675 (1975) (upholding conviction of corporation presi-
dent under Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act without proof of either his knowledge
or intent with respect to violations of the Act at a rodent-infested warehouse).
66 MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil, 933 F.2d at 52.
67 766 F. Supp. 873, 895 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
68 Id. (citing United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989)).
69 The Supreme Court in Morissette described public welfare offenses as
those that threaten injury to individuals or property for which intent is not a
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eluded that a general intent standard should govern knowing vio-
lations under RCRA regardless of whether such violations are
committed by lower-level employees or corporate officers.
II
HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE GENERAL INTENT STANDARD AND THE
PUBLIC WELFARE OFFENSE DocTRINE
A. Background: The General Intent Standard and the Public
Welfare Offense Doctrine
The common law rules governing criminal prosecutions his-
torically required proof of the defendant's guilty mind, or mens
rea.70 Exceptions to this requirement eventually were recog-
nized for crimes such as statutory rape.7 1 The mens rea compo-
nent similarly was eliminated from crimes that threatened public
health, safety and welfare. 72
These exceptions created a variety of strict liability crimes,
known as "public welfare offenses."' 3 Public welfare offenses
are "virtually always . . . crimes punishable by relatively light
penalties such as fines or short jail sentences, rather than sub-
stantial terms of imprisonment." 74 The first public welfare of-
fenses included sale of liquor to a habitual drunkard75 and
distribution of adulterated milk.76 Ultimately, public welfare of-
fenses were classified to include sale of adulterated food, drugs
and misbranded articles, narcotics violations, traffic violations,
criminal nuisances, illegal distribution of liquor, and violations of
public safety and health regulations. 77
necessary element of the offense. United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246,
252-54 (1952).
70 Id at 250.
71 Id. at 251.
72 See generally United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (National Fire-
arms Act); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (Anti-Narcotic Act);
United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1978) (securities regulations);
United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1957) (Federal Communications
Act).
73 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255.
74 United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1996).
75 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256 (citing Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398 (Conn.
1849)).
76 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256 (citations omitted).
77 Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55,73, 84
(1933). Contra Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 524
(1994) (holding that government is required to prove defendant knowingly
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The public welfare offense doctrine is narrow and ultimately
turns on whether diminishing the scienter requirement would
criminalize otherwise lawful conduct.78 In applying the public
welfare offense doctrine, courts sought to foster "a degree of dili-
gence for the protection of the public" 79 from individuals and
corporations whose conduct could adversely affect the innocent.
In an apparent departure from its 1994 trio of specific intent
opinions, the Supreme Court embraced this general intent ratio-
nale in Bryan v. United States,80 a 1998 case involving a convic-
tion under the willfulness provision of the Firearms Owners'
Protection Act.8' In Bryan, the Court affirmed the defendant's
conviction for conspiring to engage in the sale of firearms with-
out a federal license and engaging in the sale of firearms without
a license. 2 The applicable statutory language provides, "who-
ever... willfully violates any other provision of this chapter...
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than five
years, or both. '8 3 The Court held that only knowledge of the
unlawful conduct, not of the federal licensing requirement, was
necessary under the statute.84 It stated that the "willfulness re-
quirement of section 924(a)(1)(D) does not carve out an excep-
tion to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no
excuse."8
5
Public welfare offenses in the environmental law context
originated under the Refuse Act of 1899.86 Environmental viola-
tions under the Act were treated as public welfare offenses, and
the Act authorized the prosecution of individuals who had no
made use of interstate conveyance as part of a scheme to sell items that lie
knew were likely to be used with illegal drugs to sustain conviction under the
Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act).
78 Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618
(1994)).
79 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 257.
80 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
81 Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified at scattered sections of
18 U.S.C. (1994)).
82 Bryan, 524 U.S. at 200.
83 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
84 Bryan, 524 U.S. at 196, 198-99.
85 Id. at 196.
86 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467n (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998); Daniel Riesel, Criminal Enforcement and the Regulation of the
Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 1993 228 (PLI Litig. & Ad-
min. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. H-457, 1993) [hereinafter Riesel].
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specific knowledge of the allegedly criminal act.87 Significantly,
such convictions were based on the strict liability language of the
statute. The seminal public welfare offense doctrine case in the
environmental law context is the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. International Minerals & Chemical CorpfP In
that case, the defendant was charged with knowingly violating a
statute that required disclosure of hazardous chemicals on ship-
ping manifests.89 The Supreme Court invoked the public welfare
offense doctrine, stating that when "dangerous or deleterious de-
vices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the
probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware
that he is in possession of them .. must be presumed to be
aware of the regulation." 90 Therefore, the government was not
required to prove the defendant intended the illegal conse-
quences of his actions.
B. Square Peg in a Round Hole: Misapplication of the General
Intent Standard to Knowing Violations of RCRA
The public welfare offense doctrine originated in non-envi-
ronmental contexts and, for that reason, should not be trans-
planted as a paradigm standard in analyzing knowing violations
under federal environmental statutes. Several courts have misap-
plied the public welfare offense doctrine and general intent stan-
dard to govern knowing violations under RCRA. 91 The general
intent standard has also been applied to the knowing violation
provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA).92 FIFRA regulates the registration, transporta-
tion, sale and use of pesticides. Section 14(b) establishes misde-
87 Riesel, supra note 86, at 228.
88 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
89 Id at 565.
90 Id.
91 Also note that criminal enforcement provisions for knowing iolations of
the Clean Air Act (CAA) appear in section 113(c). 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1994).
At least one court has interpreted the knowing violation provision of the CAA
to require only a general intent standard. See United States v. Buckley, 934
F.2d 84, 86 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding knowledge only of asbestos emissions them-
selves, not of the statute or of the hazards such emissions pose, satisfied the
CAA's knowledge requirement). See also United States v. Fern, 155 F.3d 1318
(11th Cir. 1998) (refusing to read "willfulness" into the "knowing" language of
section 113(c)(2) in affirming a conviction for knowingly making false state-
ments concerning asbestos emissions).
92 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -13 6y (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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meanor penalties for knowing violations of any provision of the
Act.93
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Dee affirmed the de-
fendants' convictions for multiple violations of the criminal pro-
visions of RCRA.94 The defendants were civilian employees of
the United States Army involved in the development of chemical
warfare systems. The facility at which the defendants worked
had a RCRA permit for management of hazardous waste. How-
ever, the permit did not authorize storage, treatment or disposal
of such waste.95 On appeal, the defendants contended that they
did not "knowingly" violate RCRA because there was insuffi-
cient evidence to prove that they knew a violation of the statute
was a crime.96 Also, they were not aware that the chemical
wastes they managed were categorized as hazardous wastes, 97
The court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that the "ignorance
of the law is no excuse" principle applies to prosecutions under
RCRA.98 The court concluded that the knowledge element ex-
tends only to "knowledge of the general hazardous character of
the wastes." 99
In United States v. Hoflin, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the de-
fendant's conviction under RCRA for aiding and abetting dispo-
sal of hazardous waste without a permit.100 While serving as city
director of public works, the defendant directed employees to
dispose of drums containing old traffic paint by burying them at
the city's sewage treatment plant. 10 1 The defendant was charged
and found guilty of "knowingly" disposing of a hazardous waste
at an unpermitted facility in violation of section
3008(d)(2)(A). 0 2 On appeal, defendant contended that knowl-
edge that a permit was lacking is an element of the RCRA viola-
93 § 1361(b). See United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 519-
20 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (holding that "knowingly" in section 1361 required proof
that defendants, whose spraying activities caused the death of protected water-
fowl, knew they were dealing with a pesticide when they sprayed the field or
caused it to be sprayed).
94 912 F.2d 741, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1990).
95 Id. at 743.




100 880 F.2d 1033, 1038-40 (9th Cir. 1989).
101 Id. at 1035.
102 Id. at 1036.
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tion. 03 The court declined to follow the Third Circuit's analysis
in Johnson & Towers and held that knowledge of the absence of
a permit is not a necessary element for conviction under section
3008(d)(2)(A).l0 4
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Dean upheld a
knowing violation conviction under section 3008(d)(2)(A) of
RCRA. 05 As facility production manager, the defendant over-
saw the facility's employees and the day-to-day facets of its pro-
duction process. 10 6 His duties included handling and disposing of
hazardous wastes.107 He instructed employees to dispose of the
hazardous wastes by placing them into drums and burying them
in a pit behind the facility. 03 The defendant asserted on appeal
that knowledge of a RCRA permit requirement is an element of
the offense. 10 9 Like the Hoflin court, the Dean court rejected
the analysis in Johnson & Towers and held that knowledge of a
permit requirement is not an element of the crime.110
In United States v. Wagner, the defendants were convicted of
unlawfully storing and disposing of hazardous waste in violation
of RCRA.111 The Seventh Circuit also held that "knowledge of
RCRA's permit requirement is not an element of a violation."' 12
Drawing on principles of statutory interpretation, the court
stated, "[tlo read 'knowingly' as used in subsection (2) to apply
to subsidiary subsections (A), (B), and (C) would render its use
in (B) and (C) mere surplusage."'' The court also analogized
International Minerals to Wagner, noting that in International
Minerals knowledge of an Interstate Commerce Commission reg-
ulation was not required. 14
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1038-39.
105 969 F.2d 187, 190 (6th Cir. 1992).
106 Id. at 189.
107 Id.
108 IL
109 Id- at 190.
110 Id. at 190-92.
111 29 F.3d 264, 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
112 Id. at 266. See also United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 965-67 (2d Cir.
1993) (affirming conviction of owner of railroad tie-treating business for know-
ingly disposing of hazardous waste without a permit in violation of RCRA).
113 Wagner, 29 F.3d at 266.
114 Id. See also United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 415-17 (5th Cir. 1991)
(relying on Int'l Minerals and holding defendant knew or reasonably should
have known that material he was disposing was extremely dangerous paint sol-
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Employing a quintessential general intent rationale, the
Fifth Circuit upheld a conviction under section 3008(d)(2)(A) of
RCRA for illegal storage of hazardous waste in United States v.
Baytank (Houston), Inc."15 The court held that the knowledge
requirement meant "no more than that the defendant knows fac-
tually what he is doing .. and it is not required that he know
that there is a regulation which says what he is storing is hazard-
ous under the RCRA. ''11
6
In the most recent knowing violation case under RCRA, the
Sixth Circuit in United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc.
117
affirmed the defendant's conviction for knowingly storing and
disposing hazardous waste without a permit in violation of
RCRA." 8 The case involved the vice president in charge of the
manufacturing process at an industrial paint manufacturing com-
pany." 9 The company's manufacturing process included the
storage and disposal of hazardous waste. Drums containing haz-
ardous wastes, some of which were leaking, 20 were stored at the
company's premises without a RCRA storage permit. Although
the defendant had a hazardous waste disposal company dispose
of some of the drums, he had a company drain the liquids on site.
Rainwater that had collected in the drums was dumped onto the
ground and the remaining residue was collected into one drum.
The court noted that the Sixth Circuit has rejected the "knowl-
edge of illegality" principle.121 United States v. Dean was control-
ling in the present case because the court held that section
3008(d)(2)(A) of RCRA "does not require that the person
charged have known that a permit was required. ' '1 22
The Dean court had classified a violation of RCRA as a
public welfare offense.'2 The defendant in Kelley Technical con-
tended that Dean is no longer applicable because, after Staples,
the public welfare offense doctrine cannot be applied to statutes
vent, the improper disposal of which was potentially dangerous to humans and
the environment).
115 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 1991).
116 Id. at 613.
117 157 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 1998).
118 Id. at 438.
119 Id. at 435.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 436.
122 Id. at 437 (citing United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 191(6th Cir. 1992)).
123 See Dean, 969 F.2d at 191.
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that have felony provisions. 124 The Kelley Technical court dis-
agreed for two reasons. First, the holding in Dean was premised
on the plain language of the RCRA statute, not the public wel-
fare offense doctrine.125 Second, even to the extent that Dean
was premised on the public welfare offense doctrine, "neither
Staples nor X-Citement Video undermined the application of the
public welfare offense doctrine to felony prosecutions under
RCRA."1
26
As evidenced by this line of cases, courts have failed to rec-
ognize that the public welfare offense doctrine and general intent
standard are inappropriate in the context of knowing violations
of permit requirements or permit status under RCRA. As with
RCRA, such knowledge of the law also is easy to ascertain under
the Clean Water Act (CWA) because the governing law often
takes the form of a permit 27 for which a company must apply to
be regulated under the CWA's provisions. Knowing violations of
permit requirements under these statutes require application of
the specific intent standard. To knowingly violate a permit, an
alleged violator must be aware of the existence of such a permit
governing the activities in question. It is unfair and illogical to
convict a defendant of "knowingly" violating a permit of which
the defendant was unaware.
Part Iml of this Article illustrates the ramifications of the fed-
eral courts' flawed approach in applying the general intent stan-
dard to knowing violations of RCRA. This misapplication of the
general intent standard fueled, at least in part, a concomitant fail-
ure by the federal courts to apply the specific, rather than gen-
eral, intent standard to knowing violations of the CWA.
124 Kelly Technical, 157 F.3d at 438
125 Id. at 438-39.
126 Id. at 439.
127 For example, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permits under section 402 and dredge and fill permits under section 404 are
available under the Act. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
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III
HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN APPLICATION OF THE
SPECIFIC AND GENERAL INTENT STANDARDS FOR KNOWING
VIOLATIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
A. Cases Applying the Pre-1987 Amendment Language
Early convictions under the Clean Water Act were secured
pursuant to section 309(c)(1), 128 the willful or negligent provision
of the Act. This provision was revised with the 1987 Amend-
ments to the Act.129 Only a few cases tested the scope of this
pre-1987 Amendment language. In 1979, the Third Circuit in
United States v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc. affirmed the defendants'
convictions for willfully or negligently discharging pollutants into
navigable waters of the United States without a permit. 30
Frezzo Brothers, Inc., a mushroom farming business, and the in-
dividual defendants "had willfully discharged manure into the
storm water run-off system that flowed into the channel box and
into the stream.' 3' Counts One through Four of the indictment
alleged that the defendants willfully discharged pollutants with-
out a permit, while Counts Five and Six alleged a negligent dis-
charge. 32 With respect to the willful violations discharges, the
evidence included samples of wastewater collected at the Frezzo
farm that revealed concentrations of pollutants, 133 meteorologi-
cal evidence that no rain had fallen on the dates of the dis-
charges 34 and the elimination of other possible causes of
pollution in the water.' 35 The court stated that "evidence of
someone turning on a valve or diverting wastes" was not neces-
128 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1994). This section provided, in pertinent part,
that "[a]ny person who willfully or negligently violates [various sections] of this
title .. shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than
$25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or
by both." § 1319(c)(1).
129 The Second Circuit in United States v. Hopkins summarized the changes
implemented under the 1987 Amendments as follows: "In 1987, Congress
amended § 1319(c)(1), placing the prohibitions against intentional and negli-
gent violations in separate sections, addressing negligent violations in
§ 1319(c)(1)(A) and intentional violations in § 1319(c)(2)(A); and in
§ 1319(c)(2)(A) changed the term 'willfully' to 'knowingly."' 53 F.3d 533, 539
(2d Cir. 1995).
130 602 F.2d 1123, 1129 (3d Cir. 1979).




135 Id. at 1129.
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sary to prove the willful discharge.1 6 The court concluded that
the jury could rely on the totality of the circumstances 37 and
held there was substantial evidence on the record to support each
count.138
In United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc.,
the defendants were charged with willfully and negligently dis-
charging pollutants in violation of the CWA.13 9 The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss for duplicity, 40 contending that because
different mens rea standards were applied to negligence and will-
fulness, "they are really separate offenses." 141 The court noted
that the "mens rea required for negligent conduct and that re-
quired for willful conduct cannot be viewed as entirely dis-
tinct."'142 The court relied on the fact that section 309(c) of the
Act identifies a single penalty for negligent and willful dis-
charges. 143 The court stated that "[t]he addition of the words
'negligently' or 'willfully' merely specifies the mode or method
by which this proscribed conduct was accomplished." 144 Conse-
quently, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the
indictment.
The most recent application of the pre-1987 Amendment
language occurred in 1991. In United States v. Brittain, the defen-
dant was convicted for falsely reporting material facts to a gov-
ernment agency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and for discharging
pollutants into waters of the United States pursuant to sections
301(a) and 309(c)(1) of the CWA. 145 As public utilities director
for the City of Enid, Oklahoma, the defendant oversaw opera-
tions of the wastewater treatment plant and filing of discharge
monitoring reports.146 The plant supervisor informed the defen-
dant that raw sewage was being discharged in violation of the
136 Id.
137 Id
138 Id Counts Five and Six were supported by the following evidence: eyewit-
ness testimony, samples collected at the farm, evidence of rainfall, and expert
hydrological testimony. Id at 1125, 1129. See also United States v. Hamel, 551
F.2d 107, 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1977) (affirming a conviction under section
309(c)(1) for willfully discharging gasoline into a lake).
139 487 F. Supp. 852, 857 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
140 Id. at 856.




145 931 F.2d 1413, 1414 (10th Cir. 1991).
146 Id at 1415.
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NPDES permit. The defendant had personally observed the dis-
charge of the sewage twice.147 The defendant instructed the
plant supervisor not to report the discharges. 148 The court up-
held his conviction pursuant to section 309(c)(1), which author-
ized "criminal sanctions for 'any person' who 'willfully or
negligently' violated § 1311(a) or any NPDES permit. ' 149 Al-
though the 1987 Amendments modified willful conduct to
"knowing" conduct, the old statute applied because the defen-
dant's conduct occurred prior to 1987.150 The defendant had a
duty to report the discharges according to the NPDES permit
and "he willfully allowed the discharges to continue unabated
and unreported."'151
B. Muddying the Waters of Knowing Violation
Convictions Under the Clean Water Act
The Weitzenhoff Decision
Following the 1987 Amendments, the first significant case to
address the mens rea requirement for knowing violations of the
CWA was the controversial decision in United States v.
Weitzenhoff. 52 The Ninth Circuit in Weitzenhoff applied the
general intent standard to knowing violations. The defendants
were convicted of violating the Clean Water Act for discharging
waste activated sludge directly into the Pacific Ocean in violation
of their NPDES permit. Classifying the CWA violation as a pub-
lic welfare offense, the court construed the language "knowingly
violated" to mean "an individual who knowingly engages in con-
duct that results in a permit violation, regardless of whether the
polluter is cognizant of the requirements or even the existence of
the permit.' 53
Concluding that the language of section 309(c)(2) was am-
biguous, the court reviewed the applicable legislative history.
The court noted that the House Report reflected an intent to im-
pose "penalties for dischargers or individuals who knowingly or
negligently violate or cause the violation of certain of the Act's
147 Id. at 1418.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1418 n.3.
151 Id. at 1420.
152 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993).
153 Id. at 1284.
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requirements."15 4 The court held that "[b]ecause they speak in
terms of 'causing' a violation, the congressional explanations of
the new penalty provisions strongly suggest that criminal sanc-
tions are to be imposed on an individual who knowingly engages
in conduct that results in a permit violation, regardless of
whether the polluter is cognizant of the requirements or even the
existence of a permit."'' s5 Therefore, the court concluded that
the government did not need to show that defendants knew the
discharge violated the plant's permit. Instead, the prosecution
could secure the convictions merely by showing that the defen-
dants acted intentionally or knowingly. 156
The Weitzenhoff dissent stated that "[o]rdinary English
grammar, common sense, and precedent" warranted a specific in-
tent standard.157 The defendants had to know they were dis-
charging sewage and violating the permit. The dissenting opinion
addressed several reasons as to why the majority opinion was
flawed. First, it addressed the parallel negligence provision,
which makes it a misdemeanor to violate a permit condition or
limitation. It reasoned that, "[i]f negligent violation is a misde-
meanor, why would Congress want to make it a felony to violate
the permit without negligence and without even knowing that the
discharge exceeded the permit limit?"'15 8 Second, the dissent
stated that the CWA was not ambiguous and that the majority's
reliance on legislative history to determine the intent of Congress
was "not an appropriate way to resolve an ambiguity in a crimi-
nal law."159
The dissent next addressed the issue of public welfare of-
fenses. Historically, the penalty imposed under a statute deter-
mined the mens rea requirement.1 60 Public welfare offenses
involve light penalties and no mens rea requirement. 161 How-
ever, "[i]f Congress makes a crime a felony, the felony categori-
zation alone is a 'factor tending to suggest that Congress did not
intend to eliminate a mens rea requirement.'"1 6 2
154 id at 1283-84.
155 Id- at 1283.
156 See id. at 1284.
157 Id. at 1294 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 1295.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 1296.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1297 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994)).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
N.Y.U ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
The dissent also addressed public policy concerns under the
Clean Water Act. While the statute is "clearly designed to pro-
tect the public at large from the dire consequences of water pol-
lution,"163 the majority "does not explain how the public is to be
protected by making felons of sewer workers who unknowingly
violate their plants' permits." 164 The dissent reasoned that under
such circumstances people would be unwilling to work in sewage
treatment plants, thereby depriving the public of sewage disposal
services. 165
C. The Post-Weitzenhoff Era
The Weitzenhoff decision left widespread confusion in its
wake: The Second Circuit was the first court to apply
Weitzenhoff to knowing violations of the Clean Water Act in
United States v. Hopkins.166 In Hopkins, the defendant, who was
vice president for manufacturing and responsible for ensuring his
company's compliance with the wastewater discharge permit, was
convicted of violating sections 309(c)(2)(A) and 309(c)(4) of the
Clean Water Act. He ordered the tampering of wastewater sam-
ples and falsified reports to the Department of Environmental
Protection. On several occasions, an employee told Hopkins that
an unsatisfactory sample had been collected, to which he re-
sponded, "I know nothing, I hear nothing."'1 67 The court relied
on Weitzenhoff and other public welfare offense doctrine cases,
such as International Minerals, to support its conclusion that the
statutory provisions of the CWA strive "to protect the public at
large from the potentially dire consequences of water pollu-
tion."168 The court held that "the government was required to
prove that [the defendant] knew the nature of his acts and per-
formed them intentionally, but was not required to prove that he
knew that those acts violated the CWA, or any particular provi-
sion of the law, or the regulatory permit issued to [his
company]."'1 6
9
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit applied the specific intent stan-
dard to a knowing violation conviction under the CWA in United
163 Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1299.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995).
167 Id. at 536.
168 Id. at 540 (quoting Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1286).
169 Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 541.
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States v. Ahmad.170 In Ahmad, the defendant owned a combina-
tion convenience store and gas station. He discovered that one
of the gasoline tanks had a leak that allowed water to enter the
tank and contaminate the gas. The defendant discharged the gas-
water mixture in front of the store. Some of this mixture ran
down the street and into a creek. Other portions flowed into a
manhole and ended up in the city's sewage treatment plant.
171
The court held that the government had to prove knowledge as
to each element of the offense, "[w]ith the exception of purely
jurisdictional elements."1 72 The court reasoned that to do away
with the knowledge requirement would mean "one who honestly
and reasonably believes he is discharging water may find himself
guilty of a felony if the substance turns out to be something
else."' 73 Since Ahmad believed water, not gasoline, was being
discharged from the tank, he did not "knowingly violate" each
element of the offense.174 Citing Staples, the court also held that
the public welfare offense doctrine did not apply because gaso-
line did not pose a threat to the public's health or safety.
175
Following the Fifth Circuit's decision, the United States filed
a rehearing brief contending that Ahmad was directly at odds
with Weitzenhoff and Hopkins because it was the "first departure
from a long line of cases ... uniformly holding that Congress
intended the major pollution control statutes to be construed
under the public welfare offense doctrine."176 The court re-
sponded to these arguments by stating: 1) "knowingly violates"
applies to five possible elements;177 2) since "knowing" violations
are felonies subject to harsh penalties and years in federal prison,
a lessened mens rea requirement was unwarranted; and 3) the
government incorrectly relied upon International Minerals be-
cause the issue in that case was whether the government had to
prove defendant's knowledge of the regulation and also that hy-
drochloric acid was a highly regulated substance, whereas gas
170 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996).
171 Id. at 387-88.
172 Id
173 Id at 391.
174 Id. at 390.
175 Id. at 391.
176 Kevin A. Gaynor & Thomas R. Bartman, Was United States v. Ahmad
Wrongly Decided?, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 290, 291 (June 6, 1997).
177 These five elements are: 1) the discharge, 2) of a pollutant, 3) from a point
source, 4) into navigable waters of the United States, 5) without a permit to do
so. Id.
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was subject to a low level of regulation.178 The government did
not appeal Ahmad to the United States Supreme Court because
the high court might have affirmed it, making it binding on all
states rather than those only within the Fifth Circuit. It may also
have been awaiting the outcome of two then-pending cases:
17 9
United States v. Sinskey180 and United States v. Wilson.18'
In Sinskey, the defendants were the plant manager and plant
engineer of a large meat-packing plant. Although the plant had a
CWA permit for discharge of wastewater, the level of ammonia
nitrate in the discharged water was above the permissible level.
The defendants were convicted of "knowingly rendering inaccu-
rate a monitoring method required to be maintained under the
CWA."' 82 Defendant Sinskey was also convicted of "knowingly
discharging a pollutant into waters of the United States in
amounts exceeding CWA permit limitations."18 3 The Eighth Cir-
cuit relied on Weitzenhoff and Hopkins, rather than Ahmad, for
its holding: The government had to prove only that the defen-
dant was aware of his violative conduct, not that he knew he was
in violation of the CWA or the NPDES permit. 184 The court also
distinguished the mistake-of-law defense in Sinskey from the
mistake-of-fact defense in Ahmad. 8 5 Unlike Weitzenhoff and
Hopkins, the Sinskey court had not relied on the public welfare
offense doctrine. The Sinskey decision set forth a narrow inter-
pretation of Ahmad.18 6
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Wilson reinforced the split in
authority concerning the intent necessary for "knowing" viola-
tions. In Wilson, the defendants were convicted under the
CWA's knowing provisions for placing fill material and dirt into
wetlands without a permit. 8 7 As in Ahmad, the Wilson court
178 Id. at 290-91.
179 Id. at 293.
180 119 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 1997).
181 133 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
182 Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 714.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 715.
185 Id. at 716-17.
186 Andrew J. Thrner, Mens Rea in Environmental Crime Prosecutions:
Ignorantia Juris and the White Collar Criminal, 23 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 217,232
(1998).
187 United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1997).
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applied the term "knowingly" to each element of the offense.188
On the other hand, it did not promote a narrow application of
the public welfare offense doctrine. The court held that the
CWA "requires the government to prove the defendant's knowl-
edge of facts meeting each essential element of the substantive
offense.., but need not prove that the defendant knew his con-
duct to be illegal."'189
In 1998, the Ninth Circuit produced the most recent and
most sensible analysis of knowing violations under the Clean
Water Act. The defendant in United States v. Iverson' 90 was the
founder, president and chairman of the board of CH20, Inc. Its
drum-cleaning operation produced wastewater.19' Since the
company did not have sewer access, the defendant took matters
into his own hands by personally dumping the wastewater and
ordering employees to dump it in three areas: the plant's prop-
erty, the sewer drain of an apartment complex that the defendant
owned, and a sewer drain at his home. 192 After purchasing a
warehouse with sewer access, the defendant restarted the drum-
cleaning operation, dumping the wastewater into the sewer. The
defendant occasionally was present during the cleaning process
at the warehouse.
The court acknowledged that the CWA has a scienter re-
quirement, specifically stating that Iverson "must know that the
substance was a pollutant (i.e., industrial waste)." 193 He was
found liable as a responsible corporate officer under the Clean
Water Act because he had knowledge that his employees were
discharging pollutants into the sewer. 94 Not only did he instruct
them to carry out these actions, he also directly took part in the
disposal. The defendant also "had the authority and capacity to
prevent the discharge of pollutants to the sewer system," but
failed to do so.19
5
188 Id- at 265. See also United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462, 466 n.2 (4th Cir.
1991) (applying specific intent standard to conviction for knowingly discharging
pollutants into wetlands and determining that "knowingly" applies to each ele-
ment of the offense).
189 Wilson, 133 F3d at 262.
190 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998).
191 Id at 1018.
192 IJ
193 ML at 1027.
194 Id. at 1018-19.
195 Id. at 1022.
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Therefore, Iverson was properly decided because the defen-
dant is the type of individual whom the knowing violation provi-
sion was designed to convict. His activities were conducted in
knowing disregard of the governing law under the CWA. Appli-
cation of the specific intent standard would convict similarly
egregious violators of the CWA, such as the "midnight dumpers"
in Weitzenhoff, without compromising the aggressive criminal en-
forcement agenda that Congress envisioned under section 309.
IV
APPLICATION OF THE SPECIFIC INTENT STANDARD TO
KNOWING VIOLATIONS OF THE
CLEAN WATER ACT
One commentator has noted, "[t]he most hotly debated
question in the environmental crimes area is whether the dimin-
ished knowledge requirement under the public welfare offense
doctrine may be applied to charges of violating a discharge per-
mit."'1 96 This Article establishes a framework in which misappli-
cation of the general intent standard and public welfare offense
doctrine to knowing violations of permit-based limitations of the
Clean Water Act may be analyzed. An individual discharging a
regulated substance for which a permit has been obtained could
innocently exceed the limitations imposed by the permit if she
had no knowledge of such limitations. Since the discharge of pol-
lutants would be lawful in light of the plant's possession of a per-
mit, what renders the act illegal is the discharge outside the
parameters of the permit. The elimination of a mens rea require-
ment for that latter aspect of the crime (relating to permit limita-
tions) would criminalize otherwise lawful conduct 197 Therefore,
Clean Water Act permit violations should not be treated as pub-
lic welfare offenses.
The specific intent standard should govern prosecution of
knowing violations of CWA permit limitations. Arguments sup-
porting application of a specific intent standard for such viola-
tions can be divided into five categories: 1) the negligence
provision; 2) the knowing endangerment provision; 3) the CWA's
196 John F. Cooney, et al., Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES DESKBOOK 26 (1996).
197 United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1298 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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enactment history; 4) the rule of lenity;198 and 5) the penalty
structure. Congress' inclusion of the negligence and knowing en-
dangerment provisions in section 309, coupled with the 1987
Amendments to section 309(c)(2)(A), indicate that "knowing"
violations of the Act at least require knowledge of the existence
of the permit, if not the conditions contained in the permit. The
rule of lenity and the penalty structure of section 309 further con-
firm the conclusion that the specific intent standard should gov-
ern interpretation of knowing violations of the Clean Water Act.
A. The Negligence Provision: Section 309(c)(1)
In the Clean Water Act, Congress specifically provided for
those instances when defendants who act with a reduced level of
criminal intent may be subject to criminal sanctions. Under sec-
tion 309(c)(1), defendants may be prosecuted for negligent viola-
tions of the Act.199 Congress classified such violations as
misdemeanors.20 The absence of a heightened mens rea stan-
dard under section 309(c)(2)(A) would create the absurd result
of making negligent conduct punishable as a misdemeanor, while
those defendants who engage in innocent conduct could face fel-
ony, convictions, harsh penalties and imprisonment.201 To inter-
pret the felony provisions of the CWA as not requiring proof of a
guilty intent would render duplicative the negligence provision.
The Supreme Court is "hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a
congressional enactment which renders superfluous another por-
tion of that same law. '20 2
198 The rule of lenity requires that ambiguities in criminal statutes be re-
solved in favor of the defendant. See United States v. Borow, Ski. 977 F.2d 27,
31-32 (1st Cir. 1992).
199 The negligence provision states, in pertinent part:
Any person who... negligently violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317,
1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, or 1345... or any permit condition or limitation
implementing any of such sections in a permit... shall be punished by a
fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or
by imprisonment of not more than 1 year, or by both.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) (1994).
200 § 1319(c)(1).
201 Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1295 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
22 Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837
(1988).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
N.YU. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
B. The Knowing Endangerment Provision: Section 309(c)(3)
Like other environmental statutes such as RCRA20 3 and the
Clean Air Act,204 the CWA has a "knowing endangerment" pro-
ViSion.2 0 5 Section 309(c)(3)(A) of the CWA states that "[a]ny
person who knowingly violates [various sections of the Act] ...
and who knows at that time that he thereby places another per-
son in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury .... " is
subject to criminal sanctions.2 06 Since Congress included this
provision in the statute-which addresses a heightened and more
serious type of "knowing" violation-the courts should not read
a general intent standard into "knowing" violations.
Inclusion of the knowing endangerment requirement rein-
forces the "stratification" 20 7 of the levels of criminal awareness
that Congress intended in section 309. The language and inter-
pretation of section 309(c)(3) establish a "somewhat substantial
203 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1994). The knowing endangerment provision of
RCRA provides in pertinent part:
Any person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, disposes of, or ex-
ports any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subtitle ... who
knows at that time that he thereby places another person in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury, shall, upon conviction, be subject
to a fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for not more than
fifteen years, or both.
§ 6298(e)
204 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A) (1994). The knowing endangerment provision
of the CAA provides in pertinent part:
Any person who knowingly releases into the ambient air any hazardous
air pollutant listed pursuant to section 7412 of this title or any extremely
hazardous substance listed pursuant to section 11002(a)(2) of this title
that is not listed in section 7412 of this title, and who knows at the time
that he thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine under
Title 18, or by imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or both.
§ 7413(c)(5)(A)
205 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A) (1994). The CWA's knowing endangerment
provision provides in pertinent part:
Any person who knowingly violates [various sections] of this title, or any
permit condition or limitation implementing any of such conditions in a
permit .. and who knows at that time that he thereby places another
person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, shall, upon
conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $250,000 or imprison-
ment of not more than 15 years, or both.
§ 1319(c)(3)(A)
206 § 1319(c)(3)(A)
207 The term "stratification" refers to Congress' deliberate delineation among
the degrees of awareness required and the extent of criminal sanctions imposed
for knowing endangerment, knowing, and negligent violations under section
309.
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threshold for the prosecution to prevail on endangerment
charges."208 Given the severe penalties at stake under this provi-
sion, the government "must show both a violation and that the
defendant knew that by the violation he endangered a per-
son."209 Knowingly endangering others is analogous to know-
ingly violating a permit condition; both involve deliberate
conduct and awareness that one's conduct violates the law.
Therefore, because case law supports a specific intent standard
for knowing endangerment violations and because knowing vio-
lations are more analogous to knowing endangerment violations
than to strict liability or negligence offenses, the specific intent,
rather than general intent, standard should also be applied to
knowing violations under the CWA.
Interpreting the Clean Water Act's knowing endangerment
provision, the First Circuit in United States v. Borowski vacated
the convictions of a company and its owner for knowingly violat-
ing pretreatment standards for industrial waste discharges. 210
The defendant was the owner of a manufacturing facility that
produced optical mirrors for use in aerospace guidance and sight-
ing systems.211 The defendant participated in the disposal of
spent nickel and nitric acid plating baths into sinks leading to a
sewer and also ordered employees to do the same.212 This con-
duct resulted in non-compliance with EPA pretreatment regula-
tions.213 Disposal of such chemicals exposed employees to
serious health problems such as allergic reactions, chemical
bums, skin disorders and respiratory problems.214 For purposes
of appeal, the court assumed the defendants knoingly violated
the CWA and knew they had placed their employees in dan-
ger.215 The issue presented was whether the defendants knew
they had placed the employees in imminent danger.2
16
208 Kevin A. Gaynor & Thomas R. Bartman, Crininal Enforcement of Envi-
ronmental Laws, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENvrt. L. & POL'Y 39, 73 (1999).
209 Id
210 977 F.2d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 1992).
211 Id at 28.
212 ICL at 28-29.
213 Id- at 28.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 29.
216 Id
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The court relied on three factors in determining the defen-
dants lacked this knowledge.217 First, it recognized that the
CWA "is not a statute designed to provide protection to indus-
trial employees who work with hazardous substances."218 Sec-
ond, it determined that RCRA, not the CWA, is a more
appropriate statute for the "general handling, treatment and
storage of hazardous substances. 2 19 Lastly, due to the ambiguity
of the statute, the court applied the rule of lenity. This rule re-
quires that ambiguities in criminal statutes be resolved in favor of
the defendant. 220 Based on these three factors, the court held
that a "knowing endangerment prosecution cannot be premised
upon danger that occurs before the pollutant reaches a publicly-
owned sewer or treatment works."
'221
The Borowski case illustrates the high threshold the govern-
ment must meet to secure a knowing endangerment conviction.
The defendants' conduct in Borowski did not rise to the level of
knowing endangerment; however, their conduct satisfied the re-
quirement for a knowing violation. The court's reliance on the
rule of lenity reinforces the need to make the punishment fit the
crime-the harshest sanctions should be imposed against only
the most egregious violators. This theme also applies to the need
for a specific intent standard for knowing violations. The lesser
offenses available under 1) the negligence provision in section
309(c)(1) or 2) the civil penalties provision in section 309(d) for
violations of various sections of the Act without regard to mens
rea are available and more appropriate for defendants who did
not knowingly violate a permit condition or limitation under the
CWA.
217 Id. See also United States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6, 13-14 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), rev'd sub nom., United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643 (2d
Cir. 1993) (holding that knowing endangerment means more than the mere pos-
sibility or risk that death or serious bodily injury is a foreseeable consequence
of a discharge; defendant must know there is a high probability that the dis-
charge places another person in imminent danger).
218 Borowski, 977 F.2d at 29.
219 Id. at 31.
220 Id. at 32. See also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 148 (1994)
(quoting Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990)); Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985).
221 Borowski, 977 F.2d at 32.
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C. Enactment of the Knowing Violation Provision
The enactment history of the Clean Water Act's knowing vi-
olation provision supports a specific intent interpretation. When
Congress drafted section 309 of the CWA, despite its authority to
do so, it "did not adopt the strict criminal liability of earlier pub-
lic welfare statutes .... Instead it required proof of a mens rea
or scienter." 2m2 Even when Congress amended the CWA in 1987,
the scienter requirement was not deleted. Instead, it was modi-
fied to acknowledge two levels of intent: "negligent" violations
and "knowing" violations.223 Similarly, Congress changed the
term "willfully" to "knowingly." This adjustment suggests Con-
gress' intention to retain a heightened mens rea standard without
requiring that the defendant deliberately violate the Act. The
change from willfully to knowingly does not, as the Hopkins
court determined,224 reflect Congress' intention to create a gen-
eral intent standard for knowing violations of the Act.2
Moreover, EPA's exercise of investigative discretion is gov-
erned by the level of the actor's culpability. The EPA instructs
its employees that evidence of a deliberate violation "will be a
major factor indicating that criminal investigation is war-
ranted.'' 226 It is well established that an agency's interpretation
of its own statutes and regulations must be afforded great defer-
= See Riesel, supra note 86, at 227-28
223 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
224 United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 540 (2d Cir.1995) (concluding that
the change from "willfully" to "knowingly" permits the inference that "Con-
gress intended not to require proof that the defendant knew his conduct dio-
lated the law or a regulatory permit").
225 The EPA has reinforced the relevance of the heightened level of knowl-
edge that a criminal sanction entails under the Act. For example, Robert M.
Perry, then-EPA Associate Administrator, made the following remarks in a
1982 guidance memorandum to EPA Regional Counsels:
An individual who engages in conduct prohibited by statute or regulation
can be prosecuted civilly or administratively without regard to the mental
state that accompanied the conduct. Criminal sanctions, on the other
hand, will ordinarily be limited to cases in which the prohibited conduct is
accompanied by evidence of "guilty knowledge" or intent on the part of
the prospective defendant(s).
Memorandum from Robert M. Perry, Associate Administrator, to Regional
Counsels, Regions I-X, Criminal Enforcement Priorities for the Environmental
Protection Agency 1 (Oct. 12, 1982) (on file with author).
226 Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Director, Office of Criminal En-
forcement, to All EPA Employees Working in or in Support of the Criminal
Enforcement Program, The Exercise of Investigative Discretion 5 (Jan. 12, 1994)
(on file with author).
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ence.22 7 Therefore, because EPA advises its employees to seek
evidence of heightened mens rea, courts should require similar
proof.
Prior to the 1987 Amendments, criminal conduct was prose-
cuted under the "willful" provision.228 In 1987, this provision
was amended to a "knowing" provision.22 9 This change in-
creased the government's success in prosecuting violations be-
cause a lessened showing of knowledge was required-
defendants only had to have an awareness of their violative con-
duct. Now, with the "knowing" provision, there is a split in au-
thority as to the intent necessary for conviction.230 This split in
authority is evidence that the provision is ambiguous in that it
admits of two conflicting interpretations. To the extent a crimi-
nal provision of a statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity should
apply, as discussed in the next section of this Article. The rule
requires application of the specific intent standard for violations
of section 309 (c)(2)(A).
D. The Rule of Lenity
Courts construe penal statutes narrowly to safeguard the
rights of criminal defendants. Consistent with this approach,
courts apply a canon of statutory construction known as the "rule
of lenity" when interpreting criminal provisions of statutes.
231 If
a court determines that penal statutory language is ambiguous, it
must apply the rule of lenity.232 To ensure defendants have "fair
warning" of what actions constitute crimes, "lenity principles 'de-
mand resolution of ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the
defendant." 233 Therefore, in the face of ambiguous language in
a criminal statute, the courts must adopt a less severe interpreta-
227 See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
228 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
229 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
230 Compare United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1993)
(applying a general intent standard for knowing violations), with United States
v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 390-91 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying a specific intent stan-
dard for knowing violations).
231 United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1025 (9th Cir. 1998).
232 Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1295 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
233 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 148 (1994) (quoting Hughey v.
United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990)); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419, 427 (1985).
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tion.234 Courts require a high threshold to trigger application of
the rule of lenity. The statutory language must contain a "griev-
ous ambiguity or uncertainty." 235 In evaluating the gravity of an
alleged ambiguity in statutory language, congressional intent un-
derlying the language is addressed. 23 6
In the context of section 309(c)(2)(A) of the CWA, interpre-
tation of the term "knowingly violates" has created a conflict be-
tween application of the specific and general intent standards.
Since the two standards are competing and there are irreconcila-
ble interpretations of the knowing violation language, a grievous
ambiguity exists. Therefore, the rule of lenity must be applied237
and the "less severe interpretation" would prevail; specifically,
that interpretation which endorses the specific intent standard
for knowing violation cases.
Application of the rule of lenity to require the specific intent
standard for knowing violations promotes fairness in two re-
spects. First, it promotes an equitable reading of the statute to
protect the rights of the accused. Courts must refrain from inter-
preting penal statutes in a manner that extends the range of pos-
sible culpability or increases the degree of possible criminal
sanctions beyond the legislature's intent in enacting the statute.
Potential defendants are entitled to notice and due process with
respect to potential criminal violations. Second, the rule of lenity
promotes fairness in that it helps avoid overcriminalizing alleg-
edly criminal conduct by precluding application of the general
intent standard-only defendants who knowingly disregard a
permit condition or standard under the CWA, as opposed to
those who are merely aware of their acts, should be subject to the
harsh sanctions under section 309(c)(2)(A).
E. Penalty Structure
Public welfare offenses are "virtually always... crimes pun-
ishable by relatively light penalties such as fines or short jail
sentences, rather than substantial terms of imprisonment."238 On
234Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 148; Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1295.
235 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994) (quoting Chapman
v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)).
236 United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (citations omitted) ("The
rule of lenity applies only if 'after seizing everything from which aid can be
derived,' we can make 'no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.'").
237 United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795, 796 (9th Cir. 1992).
238 United States v. Ahmnad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1996).
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the other hand, "knowing" violations are serious felonies. Rely-
ing on Staples, the Fifth Circuit in Ahmad held that "[s]erious
felonies... should not fall within the [public welfare] exception
'absent a clear statement from Congress that mens rea is not re-
quired."' 12 39  Therefore, because violations of section
309(c)(2)(A) are punishable by fines of up to $50,000 per day,
imprisonment of up to three years, or both, it is inappropriate to
apply the general intent standard to such violations.
The penalty structure reflects Congress' deliberate stratifica-
tion of culpability in section 309. The more a potential defendant
is aware of her violative conduct and the law that makes it a
crime, the more severe the potential criminal sanctions. Con-
gress would not have enacted this graduated scale of sanctions
from civil penalties to criminal fines and imprisonment if it had
intended the general intent standard to apply to knowing viola-
tions under section 309(c)(2)(A). The general intent standard,
particularly in the context of the public welfare offense doctrine,
operates much like a strict liability standard. Congress, however,
indicated its understanding that criminal sanctions require a cul-
pable mental state-section 309(c) lists "negligent," "knowing"
and "knowing endangerment" versions of this mens rea-and its
understanding that conduct that lacks these levels of awareness
can be addressed on a strict liability basis through civil penalties
assessed under section 309(d).
V
THE HANOUSEK CASE AND THE NEED FOR A
SPECIFIC INTENT STANDARD
The adverse effects of the Weitzenhoff decision and misap-
plication of the public welfare offense doctrine are more evident
in cases under the Clean Water Act than in cases under other
federal environmental statutes. The most recent and potentially
most disturbing misapplcation of the general intent standard oc-
curred in the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Ha-
nousek,240 which addressed a violation of section 309(c)(1), the
negligence provision. The Hanousek case is the latest in a line of
cases that have imposed criminal liability on individuals who vio-
late public welfare statutes regardless of whether such individuals
239 Id. (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 618).
240 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000).
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possess the requisite level of mental culpability. More troubling
still, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case and in so
doing bypassed an ideal opportunity to resolve definitively the
standard to apply for criminal violations of the CWA.
In Hanousek, the Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction of a
defendant for negligently discharging a harmful quantity of oil
into navigable waters of the United States in violation of sections
309(c)(2)(A) and 311(b)(3) of the Clean Water Act.2 41 As road-
master of the White Pass & Yukon Railroad, the defendant was
.responsible "'for every detail of the safe and efficient mainte-
nance and construction of track, structures and marine facilities
of the entire railroad... and [was to] assume similar duties with
special projects."' 242 One such project involved rock-quarrying
near the Skagway River, a navigable waterway of the United
States. 243 A high-pressure petroleum pipeline ran parallel to the
railroad. A work platform of sand and gravel was constructed to
protect the pipeline. On the evening of October 1, 1994, while
clearing fallen rocks in the vicinity of the unprotected pipeline, a
backhoe operator struck the pipeline, causing a rupturem24 The
defendant was charged following an investigation.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the government
had to prove he acted with criminal negligence rather than ordi-
nary negligence. 245 The court disagreed, concluding that "Con-
gress intended that a person who acts with ordinary negligence
... may be subject to criminal penalties.1246 The court classified
the violation of section 309(c)(1)(A) as a public welfare of-
fense,247 holding that the doctrine also supported assessment of
criminal penalties against the defendant for ordinary
negligence.248
On January 10, 2000, the Supreme Court denied a petition
for writ of certiorari for the Ninth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Hanousek.249 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
O'Connor, dissented in the denial. 50 The dissenting opinion
241 Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1118.
242 Id at 1119.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 1120.
246 Id. at 1121.
247 Id.
248 Id
249 528 U.S. 1102 (2000).
250 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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stated that it was incorrect to interpret a violation of the CWA as
a public welfare offense.25' The dissent maintained that the
Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the public welfare of-
fense doctrine "imposes criminal liability for persons using stan-
dard equipment to engage in a broad range of ordinary industrial
and commercial activities. '252 The dissent also argued that harsh
penalties are associated with the negligent and knowing provi-
sions.253 Therefore, through misapplication of the public welfare
offense doctrine, individuals engaged in ordinary negligence
under section 309(c)(1)(A) could be subject to criminal sanctions
that are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense.
Justice Thomas concluded his dissenting opinion with a well-
reasoned plea for review of the scope and applicability of the
public welfare offense doctrine:
[W]e have never held that any statute can be described as cre-
ating a public welfare offense so long as the statute regulates
conduct that is known to be subject to extensive regulation
and that may involve a risk to the community. Indeed, such a
suggestion would extend this narrow doctrine to virtually any
criminal statute applicable to industrial activities .... To the
extent that any of our prior opinions have contributed to the
Court of Appeals' overly broad interpretation of this doctrine,
I would reconsider those cases. Because I believe the Courts
of Appeals invoke this doctrine too readily, I would grant cer-
tiorari to further delineate its limits. 254
Therefore, though the case involved a violation of section
309(c)(1), its ramifications affect future interpretations of section
309(c)(2)(A). The analytical thread common to both contexts-
the public welfare offense doctrine-has been misapplied and
threatens to overcriminalize conduct that is prosecuted under ei-
ther the negligence or knowing violation provisions.
CONCLUSION
The specific intent standard should govern knowing viola-
tions under section 309(c)(2)(A) of the Clean Water Act. Con-
gress has spoken directly to the need for "knowledge" of
wrongdoing in the language of this provision and has distin-
251 Id. at 1103.
252 Id.
253 Id at 1104.
254 Id. at 1105.
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guished such knowledge from the level of awareness required for
violations of the knowing endangerment and negligence provi-
sions. Applying a general intent standard to violations of section
309(c)(2)(A) would undermine congressional intent by rendering
meaningless the purpose and effect of the stratification of levels
of awareness that Congress intended in enacting these provi-
sions. In addition, use of the general intent standard risks
criminalizing otherwise innocent behavior and excessively
criminalizing conduct that should be governed by lesser criminal
charges.
The public welfare offense doctrine originated in non-envi-
ronmental contexts and, for that reason, should not be trans-
planted as a paradigm standard in analyzing knowing violations
of permit-based limitations under the CWA. The cases discussed
in this Article that applied the public welfare offense doctrine in
contexts outside the federal environmental statutory framework
are correctly decided because such cases arose under a non-statu-
tory scheme that did not include knowing violation provisions.
In International Minerals, for example, the Court invoked the
public welfare offense doctrine to allow knowledge of a regula-
tion to be imputed due to the threat to the public's health and
safety.255 Such knowledge, however, should not be imputed for
knowing violations of the Clean Water Act, because Congress ex-
pressly included mens rea provisions in section 309 of the Act.
In denying certiorari in the Hanousek case, the Supreme
Court bypassed an important opportunity to resolve the confu-
sion that has plagued the federal courts since Weitzenhoff. In re-
fusing to address misapplication of the public welfare offense
doctrine to criminal prosecutions under the CWA, the Supreme
Court has perpetuated piecemeal and contradictory jurispru-
dence concerning whether the specific intent or general intent
standard should govern knowing violations under the Clean
Water Act.
255 United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971).
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